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What are the stated goals of Hamas?

 by Edward Ulrich, December 8, 2023




An image from a 25th anniversary gathering of Hamas.  Image from Wikipedia.

Israel concedes that it initially created Hamas in the 1970’s as a means to destabilize the PLO, and it claims that the group “went rouge” in 1988 where it aligned with Iran and turned against Israel, where it then perpetrated many terrorist attacks against the the country.

In 1988, Hamas wrote its first charter where it advocated for the obliteration of Israel through Jihad, the rejection of peaceful settlements with Israel, and it incited to kill Jews by citing scripture from the Quran.

In 2017, the group wrote an “updated” charter which has less antisemitic language, but it still says that Israel has no right to exist.  It is often criticized as being a cosmetic effort designed to make Hamas sound more palatable while actually not changing anything about its underlying aims and methods.

This article contains excepts from the 1988 charter, and text from a Wikipedia page about the 2017 charter.

 

HAMAS’ 1988 CHARTER

Following are excerpts from Hamas’ original 1988 charter, from this link on the website for the Israel Foreign Ministry:

The Goals of HAMAS:  “The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam.  It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.”

On the Destruction of Israel:  “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.” (Preamble)

The Exclusive Muslim Nature of the Area:

“The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [Holy Possession] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day.  No one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part of it.” (Article 11)

“Palestine is an Islamic land… Since this is the case, the Liberation of Palestine is an individual duty for every Moslem wherever he may be.” (Article 13)

The Call to Jihad:

“The day the enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem.  In the face of the Jews’ usurpation, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.” (Article 15)

“Ranks will close, fighters joining other fighters, and masses everywhere in the Islamic world will come forward in response to the call of duty, loudly proclaiming: ‘Hail to Jihad!’  This cry will reach the heavens and will go on being resounded until liberation is achieved, the invaders vanquished and Allah’s victory comes about.” (Article 33)

Rejection of a Negotiated Peace Settlement:

“[Peace] initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement…  Those conferences are no more than a means to appoint the infidels as arbitrators in the lands of Islam…  There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by Jihad.  Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.” (Article 13)

Condemnation of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty:

“Egypt was, to a great extent, removed from the circle of struggle [against Zionism] through the treacherous Camp David Agreement.  The Zionists are trying to draw other Arab countries into similar agreements in order to bring them outside the circle of struggle. … Leaving the circle of struggle against Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who perpetrates such an act.” (Article 32)

Anti-Semitic Incitement:

“The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight Jews and kill them.  Then, the Jews will hide behind rocks and trees, and the rocks and trees will cry out: ‘O Moslem, there is a Jew hiding behind me, come and kill him.’” (Article 7)

“The enemies have been scheming for a long time … and have accumulated huge and influential material wealth.  With their money, they took control of the world media…  With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the globe…  They stood behind the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution and most of the revolutions we hear about…  With their money they formed secret organizations – such as the Freemasons, Rotary Clubs and the Lions – which are spreading around the world, in order to destroy societies and carry out Zionist interests…  They stood behind World War I … and formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world.  They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains…  There is no war going on anywhere without them having their finger in it.” (Article 22)

“Zionism scheming has no end, and after Palestine, they will covet expansion from the Nile to the Euphrates River.  When they have finished digesting the area on which they have laid their hand, they will look forward to more expansion.  Their scheme has been laid out in the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion.’” (Article 32)

“The HAMAS regards itself the spearhead and the vanguard of the circle of struggle against World Zionism… Islamic groups all over the Arab world should also do the same, since they are best equipped for their future role in the fight against the warmongering Jews.” (Article 32)

 

 

HAMAS’ 2017 CHARTER

Following are excerpts from the Wikipedia article about the 2017 Hamas charter:

Introduction

In May 2017 [the] Palestinian political and military organization Hamas unveiled “A Document of General Principles and Policies,” often referred to as the new or revised Hamas charter.  It advocated for a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, describing this as a “formula of national consensus.”  It also referred to Israel as an “illegal entity” and retained the organization’s commitment to armed struggle.

The 1988 Hamas Charter had been widely criticized for its antisemitism; the 2017 document stated that Hamas’ fight was not with Jews as such because of their religion but with the Zionist project.  However, Hamas fell short of repudiating the original, 1988 charter, saying it was a document of its time and the new document represented Hamas’s position for now.

Views on the 2017 document varied.  While some welcomed it as a sign of pragmatism and increased political maturity, and a potential step on the way to peace, many others dismissed it as a merely cosmetic effort designed to make Hamas sound more palatable while changing nothing about Hamas’ underlying aims and methods.

 

Presentation

Hamas leader Khaled Mashal presented the document at a press conference in Doha on 1 May 2017.  The new document was the result of years of internal discussions; many Hamas members still regarded its text as controversial.

In his presentation, Mashal described the Hamas movement as following a middle way between two poles: extremism (tatarruf or tashaddud) and flexibility (muyu’a, literally: “liquidity”).  In comparison to the Hamas Charter of 1988, which was marked by religious rhetoric and utopian ideas, the newer document was characterized by simple and mostly pragmatic political language.  It contained a preamble and 42 paragraphs in which Hamas outlined its positions on the fundamental aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict.  The document affirmed the movement’s adherence to its founding principles, but also left open gray areas to allow Hamas political room for maneuver in the future.

In a departure from the tone of the original charter, which presented the fight against Israel as a religious struggle, the new document said that there was a nationalist conflict “with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion.”  However, the old charter, which was much criticized for its antisemitic language, was not explicitly revoked; when asked, Hamas leaders explained: “The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution.  It will remain in the movement’s bookshelf as a record of our past.”  Mashal stated that the new document reflected “our position for now, which means that we are not a rigid ideological organization … The old charter was a product of its era, 30 years ago.  We live in a different world today.”  Hamas also declared its willingness to support any peace agreement accepted in a popular referendum and distanced itself from all foreign Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which, having lost power in Egypt, had come to be classed as a terrorist organization there.  The [Muslim] Brotherhood is not even mentioned by name in the new document, although there are still traceable echoes of their ideology.

 

Contents

The document was published in two languages: Arabic and English.  There are some slight differences between the two language versions, but these are not significant.  They mainly concern differences in nuance and connotation.

The first paragraph describes Hamas as a nationalist liberation and resistance movement characterized by Islam.  Under the heading “The Land of Palestine” (paragraph 2), the document then names the geographical borders of Palestine, which extends “from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and from Ras Al-Naqurah in the north to Umm Al-Rashrash in the south.”  Here it is affirmed that Palestine “is an integral territorial unit.  It is the land and the home of the Palestinian people.”  This clear and precise nationalist definition is followed by a general Islamic reference (paragraph 3): “Palestine is an Arab Islamic land.  It is a blessed sacred land that has a special place in the heart of every Arab and every Muslim.”

This is followed by a definition of Palestinians (paragraphs 4 to 6): “The Palestinians are the Arabs who lived in Palestine until 1947, irrespective of whether they were expelled from it, or stayed in it; and every person that was born to an Arab Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian. … The Palestinian identity is authentic and timeless; it is passed from generation to generation.”

The following part (paragraphs 7 to 11) describes Palestine as the heart of the Arab and Islamic Ummah and emphasizes the special status of Jerusalem in Islam.  In the next part (paragraphs 12 and 13), the right of the displaced Palestinians to return to their homeland is postulated to exist under divine law, human rights law and international law.

The “Zionist project” (paragraphs 14 to 17) is described as a “racist, aggressive, colonial and expansionist project based on seizing the properties of others” that is hostile to the Palestinian people and their aspirations for freedom, return and self-determination.  This project, the document says, not only poses a threat to the Palestinians, but also threatens the “security and interests” of the entire Arab and Islamic Ummah.  The document goes on to state that the conflict revolves solely around this project and that there is no religiously based conflict with Jews.  It states that “Hamas rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of his or her rights on nationalist, religious or sectarian grounds.  Hamas is of the view that the Jewish problem, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews are phenomena fundamentally linked to European history and not to the history of the Arabs and the Muslims or to their heritage.”

Under the heading “The position toward Occupation and Political Solutions” (paragraphs 18 to 23), the document describes the two-state solution, i.e. the creation of an independent Palestinian state according to the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, as a “formula of national consensus,” but without giving up the claim to the whole of Palestine, “from the river to the sea,” and “without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity.”  Rickard Lagervall viewed this as an “ambiguous formulation.”  The two-state solution is seen as a temporary stage; the long-term goal remains the liberation of the whole of Palestine.  The agreements reached in the Oslo Accords are criticized and rejected as incompatible with international law.  The state of Israel, created with the help of Western nations, is still regarded as “completely illegal” (bâtil in Arabic, a word that also has religious connotations.)

The section on “Resistance and Liberation” (paragraphs 24 to 26) also refers to international law and states that this legitimizes armed resistance against an occupying power, with armed resistance seen as “the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.”  At the same time, the document speaks of “diversifying the means and methods” of resistance and its “escalation and de-escalation.”

In the section “The Palestinian Political System” (paragraphs 27 to 34), the document adopts a very conciliatory tone – commonalities with other Palestinian groups are emphasized, differences are downplayed.  The national role of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority is explicitly recognized, and the document concludes by referring in secular language to the “fundamental” role of Palestinian women in the “project of resistance, liberation and building the political system.”

In the last two sections titled “The Arab and Islamic Ummah” (paragraphs 35 to 37) and “The Humanitarian and International Aspect” (paragraphs 38 to 42) Hamas makes it clear that it has no interest in interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the region that have seen upheaval as part of the Arab Spring uprisings.

 

Reception

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the document: “The new Hamas document says that Israel has no right to exist, it says every inch of our land belongs to the Palestinians, it says there is no acceptable solution other than to remove Israel … they want to use their state to destroy our state.”

The reception of the paper ranged from cautious welcomes to harshest rejection by those viewing it as a deceptive, merely cosmetic PR exercise.

Mohammed Ayoob, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State University, and Danielle Nicole Lussier saw the policy paper as a sign of “pragmatism,” as it left open the possibility of a two-state solution and expressed willingness to co-operate with the Palestinian Authority.  Khaled Hroub (University of Cambridge) wrote that with the paper, Hamas wanted to distance itself from the reputation of a terrorist organisation and instead “present itself as a responsible political partner whose leadership had won free and fair elections and was able to speak the language of politics and resistance in its own way.”

Beverley Milton-Edwards, a political scientist at the University of Belfast, said the declaration was an important starting point for future peace negotiations, one that other Arab parties to the conflict such as Syria, Egypt and the PLO had also advocated as part of a formula for resolving the conflicts and building peace.  Muhammad Abu Saada, a professor at Al-Azhar University in Gaza, said: “Hamas is trying to walk a fine line between its hardliners and its own moderates […] In one way, the moderates can say they accepted a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, but the hardliners can still say they are not recognising Israel.”

Azzam Tamimi, a British-Palestinian political scientist close to the Hamas movement said that the new document would “practically” replace the founding charter of 1988.  Mustafa Barghouti, party chairman of the Palestinian National Initiative, viewed the document as “a sign of maturity and a sign of political development.”  Michael Schulz (Gothenburg University) thought the statement on the two-state solution being a “formula of national consensus” showed a readiness on the part of Hamas to accept such a solution permanently even if it wasn’t its own preference, provided it could be shown to be the declared will of the Palestinian people.  According to Schulz, this would require a legitimate future referendum involving all Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as well as those living in the Diaspora.  Tristan Dunning, a political scientist at the University of Queensland, wrote in 2017 that Hamas had been open to some kind of permanent solution with Israel since the mid-1990s. The changes to the charter were therefore “positive and long overdue but, in many ways, […] perhaps too little, too late to make any meaningful change to the dynamics of the Palestine-Israel conflict.”  The Palestinian Authority’s Mohammed Shtayyeh accused Hamas of being decades behind in its thinking, telling CNN: “Hamas is debating things [the PLO] did 43 years ago.”

Jonathan A. Greenblatt, director of the Anti-Defamation League, said the “new charter does little to advance peace but does much to sustain conflict.”  Journalist Tim Aßmann saw a more moderate choice of words in the policy paper, but no significant change in Hamas’ position.  Political scientist Ljiljana Radonić saw the document as an attempt by Hamas to present itself in a more moderate light so as to win back more support, against the backdrop of the Egyptian government’s fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, an energy crisis in Gaza and more tenuous relations with Iran.

Shaul Bartal, an Israeli military analyst and lecturer in Palestinian affairs at Bar-Ilan University, stated that the Palestinian state created by a two-state solution would then be a state without concessions regarding Palestinians’ right of return and without a permanent solution that would also be binding for future generations.  David Keyes, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from 2016 to 2018, described the policy paper as an attempt by Hamas “to fool the world.”  Netanyahu himself crumpled up a copy of the document on camera and threw it in a wastepaper basket.  “The new Hamas document says that Israel has no right to exist, it says every inch of our land belongs to the Palestinians, it says there is no acceptable solution other than to remove Israel … they want to use their state to destroy our state,” Netanyahu said.

The Israeli Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre argued that the 2017 Hamas document presented “no change in Hamas’s basic ideology and principles, which are based on an uncompromising effort to destroy Israel through violence and terrorism, even if this is carried out in stages (presenting conditional willingness to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders).  The adjustments, changes and additions that appear in the Political Document are intended to present the appearance of Hamas’s renewal and adaptation to the current reality, but without any significant change in the principles and basic perception that constitute the core of the Document.”  In the European Union, the USA and Russia, the new document was also received rather coldly, much to Hamas’s surprise and dismay; internal critics of the document saw themselves vindicated and became louder again.

According to extremism researcher Armin Pfahl-Traughber, who pointed out the continuities in the 2017 document compared to the earlier one, the “formal moderation” of the new charter had “a clear objective,” namely “strategic deception.”  In his view, its use of “from the river to the sea” alone implied “a corresponding intention of destruction characterized by violence” towards the state of Israel, and he viewed Hamas’s October 2023 attack on Israel as but the latest illustration of this.  The Wilson Center’s Mark A. Green noted that while Hamas said in its 2017 charter that it “rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of his or her rights on nationalist, religious or sectarian grounds,” it nevertheless carried out a terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 that killed over 1,300 people in Israel.  Thus, in reality, little had changed since Hamas’ antisemitic, anti-human and jihadist beginnings: “In 2017, Hamas dressed up their terrorist objectives in more ambiguous, less violent terms.  But in 2023, they made clear what they really stood for—in President Biden’s words, ‘the destruction of the State of Israel and the murder of Jewish people.’”

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